rican states, on the other. Ironically, if Portugal had responded earlier to the pressures for decolonization when Cold War tensions were at their height, Britain and the other NATO countries might well have been more accommodating of Portuguese concerns. But by waiting until the 1970s, when East-West détente had taken root and the United States was pulling out of Vietnam, Portugal's European allies were less indulgent. After the main guerrilla organization in Guinea-Bissau declared the territory's independence in September 1973 and sought recognition of the new state from the United Nations (UN), Britain had to craft a UN voting strategy that would minimize the damage to its standing in Africa. The overthrow of the Caetano government in April 1974 and the subsequent removal of Portuguese troops from Guinea-Bissau resolved the matter before Britain paid higher costs, but MacQueen's case study illustrates how the combination of Portugal's belated decolonization and the dynamics of UN politics in the early 1970s created problems for the Western alliance.
The third article, by John Soares, Jr., analyzes the Carter administration's policy vis-à-vis Nicaragua and El Salvador in the latter half of 1979 and 1980. Soares argues that Carter was not as naïve or irresolute in Central America as some of his critics have alleged. Although Carter did initially try to establish cooperative relations with the Sandinista-led government that seized power in Managua in July 1979, senior ofªcials in the administration were mindful from the outset about the need to prevent Nicaragua from becoming a base for Soviet and Cuban subversion throughout the region. The administration therefore worked to forestall the consolidation of a Sandinista dictatorship. In El Salvador, Carter tried to follow through on his commitments to human rights while also trying to prevent the victory of Cuban-supported Marxist guerrillas, who he feared would engage in systematic repression and human rights violations if they dislodged the Salvadoran government headed by the Christian Democratic Party leader, José Napoleón Duarte. Carter was well aware of the weaknesses of Duarte's government and the abuses committed by right-wing paramilitary units, but he believed that the prospects for human rights and democratic freedoms in El Salvador would be better in the long run if the United States helped the government defeat the guerrillas. In both countries, Carter's policies were shaped by a mix of strategic considerations and humanitarian concerns.
The fourth article, a review essay by Robert Jervis, uses the publication of a new edition of John Gaddis's well-known book Strategies of Containment as an opportunity to reassess Gaddis's original argument and the extension of the book's coverage to the Carter and Reagan administrations. Although Jervis raises doubts about Gaddis's approach and predicts that neither historians nor political scientists will ªnd the new edition wholly satisfying or convincing, he contends that it is an "impressive" work from which even advanced scholars can "learn a great deal."
The ªnal article, by Piero Gleijeses, is a revised version of the article he published in the Spring 2006 issue. Because the revisions arrived after the ªnal page proofs had been submitted, they could not be incorporated into the earlier version. After considerable deliberation about the matter, I agreed to publish this revised version. The substance of the article is unchanged from the earlier version.
The issue concludes with a section of ªfteen book reviews.
